VIRTUE

VIRTUE AND FREEDOM

One of the exterior sources which guide moral discernment is law. The law was treated in Chapter Eight. There are two interior sources for moral formation and one other exterior one. The internal sources are virtue and sin; the exterior source is grace. To understand how sin detracts from moral formation and how grace is necessary for the completion of moral formation, one must first understand virtue. One cannot appreciate sickness until one understands health and one cannot understand the need for medicine or aid in general unless one understands the limitations and demands of health.

Catholic moral teaching since the Council of Trent has often been plagued by the serious limitation imposed by the idea that, once the law and freedom in a certain sense were seen in opposition to each other, the primary moral problem became how far one could stretch the law by freedom without breaking the law. In the manuals the whole emphasis shifted from seeking happiness through interior formation to playing it safe within the boundaries of the law. Though St. Thomas has given the virtues pride of place in the *Summa*, the schools of moral theology for the last four hundred years have basically removed them to the periphery of moral analysis. “In specialized moral theory, the *virtues* yielded their place to the
commandments, and were given very slight importance. They were viewed merely as good habits, and were studied only in light of the obligations involved – hence the neglect of virtues such as hope and courage, which carried no obligations, but were in daily demand.”

When the extraordinary Synod met in 1986 and commissioned the new Catechism of the Catholic Church, one of the things the Fathers requested was that the new Catechism would show a more evident connection between the commandments and the virtues. The doctrine of the virtues is in fact the central pivot on which the whole treatment of morals rests. So a realistic understanding of them is central to moral formation.

The three principles which must all participate in every human act are the will, the intellect and the passions. These three interior forces must be present in every exterior action which leads one to heaven. The problem is that since human beings enjoy freedom in every action, this very freedom itself must be channeled or, better perhaps, formed in such a way that human nature is not compromised by it.

The intellect and the will can be realized in an almost infinite variety of ways because they are spiritual powers. The passions, though they are realized in very finite ways, must be integrated into the actions of the intellect and will because of the unity of the human soul. Because of the very presence of reason, there must be many factors which converge for these human powers to be integral and produce more than just an obligation in acting, but a happiness and delight.
In the intellect there is a natural tendency to know the truth which cannot be fulfilled just by possessing the capacity. Objective study is necessary. In the will there is a natural tendency to do the good which cannot be fulfilled just by possessing this tendency. Freedom allows one to practice evil. This tendency must be realized by loving the good and committing this love to practice. In the passions, there is both a natural tendency to satisfy one’s feelings, but also a natural tendency in man that these passions be obedient to reason. The latter cannot be fulfilled simply by possessing the power but human feelings must be developed by experiencing pleasure in real human goods according to human nature understood by reason. These result from choice once one has reached the age of reason.

Since animals are limited to material goods, instinct suffices for them to act according to their nature. Since God has no potential which needs to be developed as he is pure act, there is no need to realize potential in practice to perfect it. Only man must develop qualities in his powers by practice which makes acting according to reason “second nature.” Only in man must habit and spontaneity cooperate in happy combination for him to experience true perfection of soul. The stable development of these qualities is called a habit which may be defined in this context as: “a permanent quality which enables us to act in a way that is not only prompt and skillful, but full of zest and pleasure as well.” A habit which accords with nature and so is good is called a virtue. A habit which does not accord with nature and so is bad is called a vice.

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE
When Thomas Aquinas treats virtue he uses a classic definition which has its origin in several places in St. Augustine, but is specifically expressed by Peter Lombard.iii “Virtue is a good quality of mind, by which we live rightly, of which no one make bad use, which God works in us without us.”iv St. Thomas explains that virtue is a good formation of powers in man towards their own characteristic activity. These powers are those spiritual powers involved in free choice, hence the use of the word “mind.” Human formation must be stable so that a person generally has a tendency to prefer those acts which develop unity in his powers in acting for a proper goal. Regarding knowledge, for example, no one can truly be said to be a scientific expert who makes mistakes in his field. The clause “by which we live rightly of which no one makes bad use” distinguishes intellectual virtue, for example, science from opinion. Finally, St. Thomas says that if one leaves out the last clause, this definition will suffice for those virtues which man can acquire through his own powers and so are called acquired virtues. If the last clause is left in, the definition serves only for those virtues which man can develop in light of grace. These are traditionally called infused virtues though some today use the term “instilled” for them.

HOW ONE OBTAINS VIRTUE

There are three basic sources of virtues which are necessary to experience complete human integration: nature, free choices and God. If virtue had its source only outside the soul, it would be an imposition on nature. If it had its source only within the soul, it would be innate and study and practice would not be needed
which is contrary to common experience. Instead there are seeds of virtue present in the intellect, the will and the passions. These are the natural tendencies discussed already. But they must be completed by the practice which results from free choice in order to develop human integrity.

Since man is called to an end by nature he cannot attain by nature because of the exalted character of the end, people must develop further qualities which correspond to acts by which this end is attained. There are no seeds of virtue for these acts. Instead, they must be placed in man by God and are given together with grace.

Virtues play a part in the spontaneous formation of an interior freedom according to the truth. Actions are not enough. In man the good sought in the action must be interiorized. Morals cannot be reduced to mere external conformity to a series of rules which are regarded as exterior impositions on the freedom of the will. Rather, the law is an embodiment of moral truth which must be understood and eventually spontaneously practiced because the subject understands how the actions commanded or forbidden by the law form freedom to spontaneously desire and rejoice in the good and the beautiful. “This results from habit which, since it acts in the manner of a kind of nature, makes the activity proper to it, as it were, natural and, consequently delightful. For fittingness is the cause of delight. Hence, the Philosopher in Ethics 2 gives as a mark of habit the delight taken in acting.”

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One action is not sufficient to develop positive or negative habits, virtues or vices. Aristotle says, “One swallow does not a spring make.” Nor does a mere repetition of actions form these habits or strengthen them once they have been formed. This is because this interior formation is something spiritual. Interior formation is complete when the intellect, the will and the passions are all poised to cooperate together when presented with a choice for good. This is what happens in the formation of human affection or love for the good.

If the formation is only in the intellect then though there may be a habit of science, for example, this does not participate completely in the idea of a virtue because it is not oriented to right use. Moral virtues, on the other hand, include right willing since they form loving and so presume right use.

KINDS OF VIRTUE

There are many virtues. The most basic are the acquired virtues. The principal ones which form freedom are called the cardinal virtues from the Latin word *cardo* (a hinge) because the moral life hinges on them. They are found in the four powers of the soul which contribute to human freedom: in the intellect, prudence; in the will, justice; and in the passions, fortitude and temperance. The infused virtues necessary for man to arrive at heaven are those respecting God: faith, hope and charity, and those respecting others: infused prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude. All of the cardinal virtues are necessary for human
happiness and integrity because all of the powers they form cooperate in every free choice.

PRUDENCE

Prudence is necessary in the intellect because one cannot love what one does not know. Since human action must be according to reason, one must be able first to know what human nature entails in human actions and then how to apply the general principles of human conduct whether they have their origin in the natural law, revealed law or divine inspiration to each particular action. The virtue of prudence begins in the intellect but since it is oriented to practice, it ends in the will. The good of virtue is said to involve a mean of reason between two extremes: defect and excess. The mean of truth in prudence is the truth of the individual action and whether it truly perfects human nature in the here and now. The excess would be when one affirms that a given act perfects or destroys human nature and desires it when it does not; the defect would be when one affirms that an action is not good or is not evil when in fact it is. For prudence to be perfect this knowledge must actually be implemented in an act of the will.

As a result, unlike ordinary human knowledge, prudence is not corrupted by forgetfulness but rather by contented worldliness. Bad loving corrupts moral knowledge. This can also affect conscience so that a person can easily act against his conscience because of his prior formation in wrong loving. This follows the principle: As a person is formed, so does the end seem to him. To one who is sick,
healthy food is repulsive. In the same way, to one accustomed to sin, the truly good often appears evil and undesirable.

This knowledge can be present yet reason’s judgment concerning the particular act be intercepted with the result that one does not judge correctly. That is why moral science is said to avail little for the acquisition of virtue, because even when it is had a man can still sin again virtue. It is the task of prudence to judge correctly concerning singular things to be done, to be done now, a judgment that is indeed corrupted by any sin.

JUSTICE AND CHARITY

The will must also be the subject of habits, not that a person has to will his own good. Man’s will is naturally born to his own good. But that man may will the good of another or of God, another virtue is necessary. The virtue which perfects the will of the good of the other is justice. That which perfects the willing of the good of God is charity.

Hence, the will is in no need of a habit of virtue in order to be inclined to the good proportioned to it, to which it tends because of what it is, but with respect to a good which transcends what is proportioned to the power, it needs a habit. [...] Thus there are two virtues in the will as in a subject, namely, charity and justice.

The mean of these virtues is determined by an exterior, objective standard which itself is based on the nature of the other and what is willed. The traditional term for what is willed is a right and so justice is based on rights. Rights are determined either by the nature of man himself (natural right — as in, for example,
the right to life) or by human determination (*positive right* – as in the case with political rights or other rights which depend merely on human promulgation). Justice is not determined then by how one feels when giving rights nor about who the individual is as an individual to whom rights are given, but rather by what the case demands given the various powers of the human soul. Rights determined by men (*positive right*) cannot contradict natural right no matter how powerful the person is making the law. This is because natural right is based on the transcendence of the human soul as a spirit over material considerations. This fact is reflected by Vatican II in the famous personalistic norm: “The truth about man, which the Council’s text explains ... has two main emphases. The first affirms that man is the only creature in the world that the Creator willed ‘for its own sake’; the second consists in saying that this same man ... can only find himself through a disinterested gift of self (*Gaudium et Spes*, 24:3).”

There is a great difference between ancient and modern ideas of justice and right. The ancient idea of justice reflected by the definition approved by the Church: “the constant and firm will to give their due to God and neighbor” (*CCC*, 1807) places the accent of justice on giving another person his due. Justice therefore is always other centered and is judged *ad alterum*, based on the needs of the other. This is the source of the famous idea of Plato that it is better to suffer than to do injustice. If one suffers injustice, one loses nothing morally. But if one does injustice, one is morally impaired. Instead, the contemporary idea of justice emphasizes the subject receiving rights from others.
The whole weight of the character formation is at stake here. The modern world is characterized by the attitude: “I have my rights, so I want justice.” The rights of the other do not enter. But the whole consideration of rights is based on the understanding that there is something untouchable about the human person because of the presence of the reasoning soul. Since morals is about the interior formation of the person, whether one gets one’s rights is immaterial to this formation. When one does not give the other his due, this leads to a condition in which he is lacking in soul. Coupled with the Christian idea of loving one’s neighbor as oneself and blessing enemies, this lack can be catastrophic if it involves mortal sin, for instance.

FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE

Moral freedom also includes the passions because the higher power moves the lover ones to action. In another section, this movement was explained as that of a wise governor to a free citizen, a political rule, not master to slave, a tyrannical rule. This political rule of the intellect and will also extends to the passions and so there must be virtues in the passions. This political rule is expressed in the formation of the virtues of temperance and fortitude. Temperance governs the concupiscible appetite and fortitude the irascible appetite.
These virtues differ from the virtue of justice whose mean is determined by an objective, external law. The mean in these virtues includes reference to the subject because people with different temperaments approach these virtues in different ways because the passions are involved. One size does not fit all. Fearful people are brought to the virtuous life in a different way than energetic people. The objective nature of the law regarding justice is the same, but the manner of approach differs.

Because the moral constitution of the person often colors the way a person pursues the truth, formation in these virtues is absolutely necessary to develop prudence and justice. Many have been thwarted in pursuing what they knew to be right because of a weakness in their passions.

GROWTH IN VIRTUE

Some people have the idea that growing in the virtues is just a matter of repeated actions. Since at least for acquired virtue one action does not suffice to form a virtue, many think that just repeated actions create a virtue. Sheer number of actions is the issue. Actually, since virtue is character formation in the mind, the will and the passions, the issue is not the number of acts but their intensity. It is possible to fall away from virtue and begin to prefer vice if one’s actions are lukewarm. The point is clear in the intellectual virtues. One hundred acts of distracted study are often not as valuable to developing science as a few hours of
intensive study. So the general principle is that it is not number of acts but the intensity of acts which forms and increases virtues.

The same thing is true in developing the will in love. One cannot remain on the same plane in the interior formation of love. One is either growing the intensity of love or falling out of love. The intensity of the act of love is the basis for this growth or loss. For virtues acquired by human powers, one action is not sufficient to lose the virtue. A great many actions which are less intense must be performed.

Human practice is not the source of the virtues which are necessary to form the intellect in knowing about God or in desiring him. These are called the infused or theological virtues. God is the source of these virtues. Man does not get or keep these virtues by his human practice. Instead, these virtues are directly infused by God into the soul when one receives grace. Since these virtues have the direct action of God as their origin and can only be maintained by his continuous inspiration, human acquired virtues can only be a disposition to receive them. Man does his part, but he cannot cause either grace or these virtues. He merely opens himself to receiving these with God’s inspiration. St. Thomas comments on the text in Luke regarding meriting grace, “When you have done all these things that are commanded, say: ‘We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do’” (Lk. 17:10). He says: “Man merits, inasmuch as he does what he ought, by his free-will; otherwise the act of justice whereby anyone discharges a debt would not be meritorious.”
In the case of these virtues, since they are divinely given with grace, one action in accord with or contrary to grace is sufficient to lose them. The sacrament of baptism is sufficient to receive the theological and infused virtues and one mortal sin is sufficient to lose them.

The question arises if one loses grace by mortal sin, how does this loss affect the virtues which one has formed by personal cooperation with grace? For example, if one loses infused justice, does he acquire by that action the vice of injustice. The tendency acquired by human cooperation with grace remains unless it is corrupted by further and more intense acts of injustice. So if one loses an infused virtue by one action, he does not thereby acquire a vice.

THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES

In addition to the acquired virtues, a person must be perfected regarding the pursuit of union with God as his ultimate end. No human action can bring this about. Rather, God must infuse virtues into the intellect and will so that the person can actively know and desire God by a union of friendship. Sanctifying grace elevates a person in being to this union. Since by this grace man becomes a participant in divine nature, it is fitting for God to provide inclinations in the intellect and will by which one knowing as God knows and loving as God loves becomes second nature. Divine nature becomes as second nature to the engraced Christian. These virtues are called the theological virtues because by them a
person can act motivated by the same knowledge and love which is found within the
Trinity. “If a man loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him,
and we will come to him and make our home with him.” (Jn. 14:23)

Faith is a gift from God given to the intellect by which a person knows as God
knows. Faith is the beginning of salvation because one cannot love what one does
not know. Faith is a quality present the intellect, by which a person can know and
understand the truths of God, especially those which are not open to human proof
from knowledge acquired through the senses, like the Trinity and the Incarnation.
Faith is the only kind of intellectual knowledge which depends on the will. The will
motivates the person to continuous trust and dependence on the trustworthiness of
the person revealing the truth. Human faith ends when the learner fully
understands the truth. The virtue of divine faith can never be brought to an end by
such understanding because there is always more to know. Investigation in the
mind and assent in the will run together continuously because the more one
understands the more one can understand. There is no mean for this virtue because
the infinity of God is the standard on which faith is judged. Still, there can be
extremes in faith as in all science. When one assents to a truth which is false, this
is an excess. When one fails to assent to a truth, this is a defect.

The virtue of hope is in the will. It is also communicated together with grace
and allows the person to see heaven as possible of attainment. Hope sustains this
daily moral life of a Christian by allowing the Christian to keep his gaze fixed on
heaven as his final completion in everyday acts of the will. Since God’s nature is
the standard for this virtue also, one can never hope in God enough while on earth. Though there is no strict mean for this virtue, there can be a kind of excess and defect in hope based not on God’s nature which is its measure, but on human nature. One who thinks he will get to heaven no matter what he does is guilty of the excess of presumption. One who has no hope for heaven no matter what he does is guilty of the defect of despair.

The virtue of charity exists in the will and involves union with the infinite God. By this virtue man loves God as he is in himself above all things and his neighbor as himself. This virtue is the proper intention for which one lives the commandments and for that reason the love of God and the love of neighbor form the basis for even the division of the commandments. The first table of the law of God comprising commandments 1-3 preserves the love of God. The second table of the law comprising commandments 4-10 preserves the love of neighbor.

Many people in Christianity emphasize spectacular or unusual experiences. Some others maintain that the only action which can merit heaven is in the final moment of death. Though religion may indeed involve spectacular experiences and though the moment of death is obviously a very important experience in the moral life, the actions done which result from charity are the most important. This is why St. Paul emphasizes that true interior formation must be based on the union with God expressed by charity. “If I ... have not charity,” says the Apostle, “I am nothing... Charity is superior to all the virtues. It is the first of the theological virtues.” This is the reason St. Thomas and the Catechism refer to charity as the
“form of the virtues”. This also means that one act done from charity, it does not matter what it is, is sufficient to merit heaven, not just the one act done at the moment of death.

In addition to the theological virtues, there are also infused moral virtues which grace brings to the powers of the soul. It would be unfitting for God who provides natural means of obtaining acquired virtues to provide any less for a life based on the supernatural standard of his own inner life. So, in addition to grace and the theological virtues, God also infuses into every baptized person infused moral virtues of prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. A discussion of the gifts is beyond the scope of this book, but the virtues are central to living the life of charity in everyday human life and an essential indicator of progress in the spiritual life.

Though there may be spectacular manifestations in religion, these are of relative unimportance compared to the daily practice of ordinary virtues done from charity. When embraced according to the duties of one’s state, this is the foundation of going to heaven. The practice of the ordinary virtues from extraordinary love is essential. Francis de Sales clearly expresses this most necessary truth:

Opportunities for the practice of fortitude, magnanimity, and magnificence do not often occur; but gentleness, moderation, integrity and humility are virtues with which all the actions of our lives should be colored. There are virtues nobler than these; but the practice of these is more necessary.
Among the virtues we should prefer that which suits our duty best, and not which is most to our taste and, although everyone ought to have all the virtues, yet not everyone is bound to practice them to the same extent. Each ought to give himself specially to those which are required by the kind of life to which he is called.\textsuperscript{xii}

Finally, these virtues lead to a certain peace of character within. If unhappy saints are lost from the beginning, then the more one develops the virtues of temperance and fortitude the more spontaneous one will become in living the virtues of prudence and justice. One will not only do the good, but rejoice in the good. When this happens habit and spontaneity exist in beautiful integrity with each other.

Their way to achieve this end, however, is to make the best use of emotive energy and not to suppress it. ... So far as the reference to truth is concerned, the integrating process of developing and improving the psyche gradually produces the result that the will – guided by the light of reason – learns how by spontaneous reference to emotion, by a spontaneous move of attraction or repulsion to choose and to adopt the real good; it also learns to reject the real bad.\textsuperscript{xiii}

In a note on this text, John Paul II clarifies: “This belief appears to also be contained in what Aristotle says of the power of the intellect and will over emotions having a ‘political’ (or ‘diplomatic’) rather than an absolute character. (cf. \textit{Politics}, bk. 1, chap. 3; \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, bk. 4, chaps, 3-5)”\textsuperscript{xiv}
Finally, the emphasis on the development of the virtues, as opposed to the obligation and duty simply to live an external standard, points to two different ideas of freedom on which they are based. According to Fr. Pinkaers, these are freedom of indifference and freedom of excellence. These in turn are the foundation for two entirely different ways of approaching morals which also lead to two different points of view on happiness.

Freedom of indifference comes from William of Ockham and emphasizes the simple lack of external constraint which could be realized in either good or evil. “A freedom such as this is in opposition to the desire for happiness … it can base itself only on law, which restricts freedom with the sense of obligation or duty.”\textsuperscript{xv} Freedom of excellence on the other hand, “is rooted in a desire for happiness which proceeds principally from a sense of truth and goodness, together with the inclination to life in society.”\textsuperscript{xvi} Thomas Aquinas would be the origin for this idea of freedom which emphasizes not only the will but also the intellect and passions as the origin for freedom. In this latter kind of freedom, the pursuit of virtue which \textit{ipso facto} also involves freedom from sin causes human integrity. This brings the powers of man and so the person to an interior harmony with each other which is firmly held because based on choices which induce qualities of union between the truth, love and emotions. The perception of this inner harmony leads to a joy through intellectual understanding, willed experience and emotional delight.

HEAVEN ON EARTH BEGUN
The Catholic tradition in morals is rooted in the freedom of excellence. It is in this freedom that human integrity consists because all the powers of the human soul cooperate together. When the powers of the soul have induced in them a quality which is halfway between simple ability and action, then acting according to reason and nature becomes almost second nature. Habit and spontaneity exist together then and the potential present in the human soul in man’s initial creation is realized. A person really enjoys doing good but even more being good. This happy combination leads to an experience of inner peace and happiness and when blessed by cooperation with the theological and infused moral virtues ensures that the life of the Trinity is already in the heart of man through grace. As the life induced by the virtues becomes more rooted in the character, sin and temptation are more easily avoided because one depends more on an interior perception of God and his merciful desire to aid man to get to heaven. Heaven is in a sense begun on earth and nothing remains but the vision after death.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

SIN

RECOVERING THE IDEA OF SIN

In 1973, a famous minister psychiatrist, Karl Menninger, wrote a book called *Whatever Became of Sin?* In that book he lamented the replacement of a religion of moral responsibility with psychiatry. His lamentation is perhaps even more
pressing in contemporary society and astonishingly even more pressing in the Church. For decades people have been persuaded that they need not confess a “laundry list” of sins, cataloguing even venial sins. Many religious educators deny there is a distinction between mortal and venial sin. The whole question of personal sin and responsibility has been in escrow since the Council.

Pope John Paul II characterizes the malaise well. First he quotes Pius XII who said: “The sin of the century (20th) is the loss of a sense of sin.” Then he summarizes the contemporary consequences for the Church in a lengthy paragraph.

Even in the field of the thought and life of the church certain trends inevitably favor the decline of the sense of sin. For example, some are inclined to replace exaggerated attitudes of the past with other exaggerations: From seeing sin everywhere they pass to not recognizing it anywhere; from too much emphasis on the fear of eternal punishment they pass to preaching a love of God that excludes any punishment deserved by sin; from severity in trying to correct erroneous consciences they pass to a kind of respect for conscience which excludes the duty of telling the truth. And should it not be added that the confusion caused in the consciences of many of the faithful by differences of opinions and teachings in theology, preaching, catechesis and spiritual direction on serious and delicate questions of Christian morals ends by diminishing the true sense of sin almost to the point of eliminating it altogether? Nor can certain deficiencies in the practice of sacramental penance be overlooked. These include the tendency to obscure the ecclesial significance of sin and of conversion and to reduce them to merely personal matters; or vice versa, the tendency to nullify the personal value of good and evil and to consider only their community dimension. There also exists the danger, never totally eliminated, of routine ritualism that deprives the sacrament of its full significance and formative effectiveness.
The more glaring schools of thought which make sin problematic today were discussed in Chapter Five. The importance of emphasizing virtue and joy which are intrinsic principle of moral integrity were discussed in Chapter Ten. Sin is also such an intrinsic principle. Though it is true that there has been an overemphasis on avoiding sin within the strict confines of the law which is interpreted as an external imposition since the time of the Council of Trent, an emphasis on virtue must entail a realistic assessment of just what sin is. This is because sin leads to a condition where virtue is compromised or in some cases even destroyed and so our road to happiness becomes a dead end. Virtue has to be treated first because one should know the nature of health before he can appreciate illness. Sin is moral illness.

SIN, MALICE, AND VICE

Thomas Aquinas distinguishes three conditions regarding sin which underline the interior nature of sin as illness regarding the health of virtue. They are: virtue, goodness and the act of virtue. Virtue makes the possessor and his act good. Good deeds are not enough for virtuous formation. Since the deeds are intimately connected to the formation of freedom, they must flow from free choice if they are to contribute to interior formation which includes union with God and pursuit of man’s ultimate end. So, regarding virtue, there is the interior disposition which is virtue properly speaking, the action which results from it and contributes
to its formation and the interior wholeness among all the powers of the soul which such an action forms. To have one cardinal virtue one must have them all and they each form one of the three powers of the soul which are a necessary component of every moral action: intellect, will and passions.

The term sin “refers” to the deed which is contrary to an act of virtue. Repeated acts of sin like repeated acts of virtue cause a disposition in the powers of the soul in which the subject not only does evil but begins to love and enjoy evil. This colors his judgment concerning the true and authentic good. This is called vice as opposed to virtue. Such dispositions provoke a lack of order among the powers of the soul where they are out of sync with each other so that even if a person were to convert and seek to do good, other powers of his soul would not easily come along and he would be constantly pestered by feelings and thoughts which would war against his good intentions. This is called malice which is opposed to goodness. “So three things oppose virtue: sins (or misdeeds), evil (the opposite of goodness) and vice (disposition unbefitting one’s nature).”

These three things all lead to human deformation because they are all contrary to the order of reason which in turn expresses human nature. So they are truly sicknesses of the soul. Though the deepest sickness occurs when the person develops dispositions which are contrary to his nature so that he prefers sinful acts, the deeds themselves are worse than the mere condition because dispositions though they may affect freedom are not deterministic. One can always act contrary to a disposition be it a good one or an evil one. This means that it is better to
actually do well than merely have the developed capability of doing well and the same is true of evil.

This distinction also allows one to understand the fact that, in all naturally induced integrity, one evil act does not so form freedom that it makes one a vicious person, just as one act of virtue does not so form freedom that one becomes a virtuous person. One swallow does not a spring make.

On the other hand, there are virtues which are infused or instilled by grace in man. These are the theological and supernaturally formed moral virtues. One act of mortal sin which is contrary to the existence of charity kills grace, the means by which man arrives at heaven, in the soul. So when one act of sin destroys sanctifying grace, all the supernaturally induced virtues except faith and hope end, though these only exist in an inchoate state.

SIN OF OMISSION

Another difference between sin and virtue is that since sin is a negation of freedom, it is possible to commit a sin without a deed. This is called a sin of omission. If the moral law requires someone to do something by a positive command (for example, to worship God on Sunday by attendance at Mass) and they fail to do so, then they are acting contrary to reason in a very important matter and commit a grave sin. This is because the virtue of religion which is a part of the virtue of justice, namely justice towards God, requires that man recognize the rights of the Creator in his actions. There are four actions which man must do in order to
have this virtue: two interior and two exterior. The interior acts are devotion in the will and prayer in the intellect. The exterior acts are adoration and sacrifice. Any authentic act of worship in any religion must develop these acts. Christ had all these acts on the Cross. For the Christian, the Mass is the prolongation of the worship of Christ. To be a truly virtuous person, the Christian must devoutly attend Mass each Sunday. Though this is an obligation, it strikes so closely at the interior relationship of man with God that purposely to omit it shows a complete lack of love for God. Thus, it is a mortal sin.

With the fact of omission in mind, the Catholic tradition has defined sin as “(a)ny word, deed, or desire contrary to the Eternal Law.”xvi This definition has two parts to it. There is the voluntary action or omission which sin involves in some specific action or deed. Then there is the disorder which this voluntary action or omission produces in the character. As a result of this action, the person loses integrity within, the powers of the soul cannot act together in a cohesive whole and man loses interior union with God if this is a mortal sin.

Two important characteristics of sin follow from this. First, the disorder is outside the sinner's intention, but not the sinner's knowledge. He knows that if he does something (or omits to do it) that such a disorder will follow. But he does not will the disorder as a disorder but rather whatever is the good of the action, albeit an apparent good. For example, in an act of fornication, he wills to enjoy the pleasure, knowing that he experiences this pleasure at the expense of the rights of God and respect for the other person in this act. The other person is only a good for
him because they make him feel good. Whereas there is nothing wrong with enjoying sexuality, this must be done respecting both the good of procreation and education and the good unity. The sinner intends the pleasure but not the disorder.

PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL

The difference between physical and moral evil is that, in physical evil, the natural disorder of a being causes a disorder in action. For example, a lame leg causes a lame walk. In moral evil, just the opposite is true. The lack of order in a voluntary action (it is contrary to reason) causes the lack of order in the soul. A mortal sin of fornication causes the loss of grace and the virtue of temperance and perhaps justice.

In the case of physical evil, nature will not be denied. If one abuses nature by drinking to excess, the body rebels against this unnatural condition and one becomes ill or even dies. In the moral universe, the origin of punishment is the reaction of reason to the condition of disorder. A person who dies unrepentant in mortal sin without grace cannot realize his final destiny. Freedom and nature forever disagree and this is hell. Someone murders an innocent person and the civil order reacts with imprisonment or the death penalty. Someone commits masturbation and not only do they lose grace but they experience a lack of freedom in virtuous formation in the sexual urge.

The voluntary nature of the sin is its essence. The punishment for the sin is very real and reasonable but outside the intention of the sinner. Therefore, the
kind or species of sin is determined by what the sinner is drawn to, not the punishment. Theft, for example, is “usurping another’s property against the reasonable will of the owner.”xxii The specific disorder in the character involves the will in justice and is about material goods, not about life, sexuality or the good name. The amount of the theft determines the punishment. To steal a little is a venial sin and outside virtue, not contrary to it. To steal a lot is a mortal sin and completely contrary to the virtue of justice and precludes the existence of grace and charity.

The Church still requires that for the integrity of confession all remembered mortal sins must be confessed species and number. “All mortal sins of which penitents after a diligent self-examination are conscious must be recounted by them in confession …” (CCC, 1456) Regarding sin, the exterior action is the most important classification and determines the fault of the action. It is the matter of the sin. The order which is interrupted is the form and determines the punishment for the sin. “Sins then are classified according to the voluntary act involved and the object aimed at, rather than their disorderedness. The goal of an action is its primary source of goodness, the object of the will involved. So to classify sins by objects and by goals amounts to the same.”xxiii

SIN AND GUILT

The second important consequence is that a part of the punishment for sin is the reaction within the soul to perceived moral disorder. Sin is not like virtue. One
must have all the virtues to have one as virtue causes interior integration. This integration when perceived produces a peace of character. The opposite is true of sin and vice. It is impossible for a person to have all the sins and vices because sin causes a disorder. Two vices of excess and defect are contrary to every virtue. They are also contrary to each other, so one cannot possess them all at the same time. Sin creates disorder in the character.

When someone acts contrary to reason, the person himself if he is healthy experiences an emotional uneasiness at this disorder and perhaps even sadness coupled with hatred, fear and perhaps anger. He feels incomplete. His desires have not been formed as they naturally should be according to reason. This feeling causes emotional guilt which corresponds to the intellectual perception of guilt.

Hence, it is more than an intellectual awareness of the wrong that has been done: it is an actual feeling of incompleteness. This is the way in which well-balanced, mature individuals spontaneously react and it forms the basis of the feeling of guilt which results from performing acts that are morally wrong. It is an experience of the psychological incompleteness of the human act.xxiv

Guilt then can be healthy. The difference between neurotic and healthy guilt is the difference between the mature and immature perception of a disordered act. Also, there is a distinction between the intellectual perception of the guilt and the emotional reaction to this disorder. “Both are normally present in the well-balanced person, but it is possible for an individual to have only the intellectual awareness of
guilt without any sensory feeling, or to have a feeling of guilt which is not substantiated by any rational judgment.”

Mature people feel guilt when they should. The abnormal experience of guilt involves either feeling guilty when one has not done anything wrong or what is more pathological and more characteristic of contemporary Western life, not feeling guilty when one has done something wrong. The idea that all guilt is pathological is very mistaken and the result of a Freudian psychology which does not appreciate the place of the intellect in emotional formation.

Indeed, the experience of guilt can be a powerful motive for repentance. It can also be the emotional punishment for a sin committed. Women who have had an abortion often confess this sin over and over again, motivated by the experience of guilt. While the confessor must carefully explain that the continuous confession of the sin is unnecessary and wrong if she thinks her sin was not forgiven, he may also assure her that the guilt she feels is a part of her own satisfaction for the temporal punishment due to sin and should be a motive to pray for her child and an end to abortion.

THE GRAVITY OF SIN

The gravity of the sin is determined not by its punishment but by its object. A progression in gravity is seen in the order of the commandments. Sins against God are the worst (Commandment 1-3). Sins against the self are next in gravity, which includes those very connected to the self like honoring parents
(Commandment 4). Sins contrary to the neighbor are next; there is a “lowerarchy” among them depending on how close the good involved is to the person himself (Commandment 5-8). Actions against life are worse than actions against family.

The subjective order is also taken into consideration in determining the kind and gravity of the disorder caused by sin because of the powers of the soul which are principally involved. Catholic theology commonly distinguishes between sins of ignorance, weakness and malice. This division has its source in the powers of the soul principally involved in the particular action of sin. Sins of ignorance are in the intellect; sins of weakness in the passions; and sins of malice are in the will as such.

It is true that the will is involved in some sense in all sins because it is the power of the soul by which a person places acts in morals and determines responsibility. The division of ignorance, weakness and malice express the various ways the powers of the soul relate to the will.

SINS OF WEAKNESS

The first distinction important to evaluate the relation of these powers to human action is that between actions of the will which pass into exterior matter like cutting, burning. Other acts of the will remain in the agent performing them like desiring, knowing, and loving. These are the acts which fall under morals and go to form virtues and vices. The will is the principle. However, because the will moves the other interior powers to act, these powers can also be subjects of sin as
they are subjects of virtue. The will moves the intellect to think and the passions to emote or not.

The passions themselves are good but they are also born to be obedient to reason. Before Original Sin, this was easy. Adam and Eve had an easy virtue. The passions did not arise in them before they could think and did not color their judgment by egotism. After the sin, even for those in the state of grace, the passions arise before reason can be brought to bear and often cause us to sin. Sins which result from this are called sins of weakness.

The *Catechism* refers to sins of weakness in two ways. They can be either the result of the will entertaining and taking up the passion as in “hardness of heart” or of the will being stricken by passion like an “external pressure” which is like an alien force in the will. The difference regarding responsibility for both good and evil is whether the passion arises before the act of the will or results from the cooperation and approval of the will. Approved passions make an act more willing and so more voluntary.

One has only so much spiritual energy and if all the interior spiritual energy is engrossed in the passions the influence of the intellect will be compromised. A person may be so engrossed in realizing his passions that he does not apply the universal judgment of his conscience to a particular action here and now. “Reason is fettered owing to the fact that the attention of the soul is vehemently applied to
an act of the sensitive appetite, hence it is diverted from considering in particular what it knows universally and habitually.”

In some cases, reason can resist this fettering of the passions and in these cases described as hardness of heart, the person is more responsible depending on the degree his reason approves such passions. In other cases, the passions completely bind him as in the case of psychopathic or neurotic personalities. This frees the subject of responsibility for these particular deeds unless he refuses to use all possible aids to deal with these passions. This is like the alcoholic. Since his reason is bound when drunk, he would not normally be held responsible. However, since he either drank voluntarily or refused to seek a support group if he needs help, in some sense he is responsible for the resulting condition and what results from it. For example, if he killed someone driving drunk, he would not be as responsible as someone who cold bloodedly set out to kill that person, still he would be somewhat responsible as he could have sought help and did not or simply willed not to drink.

But the will has the power to apply or not to apply its attention to something; hence it is within the power of the will to exclude the fettering of reason. Therefore the act committed, which proceeds from this fettering, is voluntary, hence it is not excused from mortal fault. But if the fettering of reason by passion advanced to such a point that it would not be within the power of the will to exclude this fettering, for example, if from some passion of the soul someone were to become insane, whatever he committed would not be imputed to him [...] except perhaps so far as concerns the beginning of such a passion, that it was voluntary.”
Passion then affects the gravity of sin and the goodness of virtue. “The more intense the movement of the will to sin, the graver is the sin; but the more intense the passion impelling to sin, the less grave the sin becomes.” So, antecedent passions and external pressures can reduce moral responsibility. “The promptings of feelings and passions can also diminish the voluntary and free character of the offense, as can external pressures or pathological disorders.”

A good example occurs regarding masturbation which the Catechism maintains is always gravely sinful in object. It then goes on: “To form an equitable judgment about the subject’s moral responsibility and to guide pastoral action, one must take into account the affective immaturity, force of acquired habit, conditions of anxiety, or other psychological or social factors that can lessen, if not even reduce to a minimum, moral culpability.” This means that though masturbation is always a mortal sin in object, by antecedent passion the subject may only be guilty of a venial sin.

One further point: strictly speaking, sins and goods in which the will increases the passion as a servant are done more freely because a person loves the good or evil more. They are “to be fervent and ardent by reason of choice of good or of evil.” In evil things, this is what is meant by hardness of heart. So they are not exactly sins from passion.

“The hardness of heart’ indicates that which according to the ethos of the people of the Old Testament, had given rise to a situation contrary to the original design of God-Yahweh according to Gen. 2: 24. [...] If in the words [...] in the Sermon on the Mount the human heart
is ‘accused’ of concupiscence [...] at the same time and by the same words it is called to discover the full meaning of that which, in the act of concupiscence, constitutes for it ‘a value not sufficiently appreciated’.

This increases the voluntary nature of the deed and so moral responsibility. “Hardness of heart [does] not diminish but rather increase[s], the voluntary character of the sin.”

SINS OF IGNORANCE

Sins of ignorance occur in the intellect. Every sin can in a certain sense be called a sin of ignorance in the sense that the intellect fails to apply the universal moral law to the particular case. Sins of ignorance involve inability to know something which precedes the act of the will which would have altered the person’s judgment or a deliberate refusal to investigate the nature of the moral action either in universal or particular.

Ignorance of the law is no excuse. One is bound to know the laws in conscience before acting. However, since moral actions are carried out in particular circumstances and deeds, there may be many circumstances which one could not reasonably be expected to have knowledge of which might have altered his choice. Ignorance of these is called invincible ignorance because it cannot be conquered by the will. It is unintentional. “Unintentional ignorance can diminish or even remove the imputability of a grave offense. But no one is deemed to be ignorant of the principles of the moral law, which are written in the conscience of every man.”
This is because the true deformed nature of the deed is not a part of the interior intention since one could or should not have known this circumstance.

On the other hand, ignorance which is caused by the will is called vincible ignorance. A person could and so should have known either the law or a circumstance which would have altered his choice. This ignorance is not real as it is feigned and certainly could be changed by the subject. “Feigned ignorance [...] do[es] not diminish, but rather increase[s] the voluntary character of the sin.”

SINS OF MALICE

The worst sin is one of pure will. This is the sin of Adam and Eve who did not experience weakness and ignorance. It is also the sin of the Pharisees in the gospels who could hardly claim weakness and ignorance in their contempt for others and rejection of Christ. Both Aquinas and the Church designate this as a sin of certain malice. “Sin committed through malice, by deliberate choice of evil, is the gravest.”

A sin of certain malice is in the will not in the sense that the will directly and principally chooses evil. This is not possible as the will is always drawn principally to some good. Rather, the will is drawn to a good principally which has an evil necessarily attached secondarily. For example, in fornication the will is drawn to the good of pleasure but secondarily attached to this good is the use of the other person and the denial of the truth which God himself placed in masculinity and femininity. “If then a person should wish so much to enjoy some pleasure, say,
adultery or some desirable thing of this kind, that he does not shrink from incurring the deformity of sin which he perceives to be conjoined to what he wills [...] Hence, the adulterer both wills principally the pleasure and wills secondarily the deformity.”

Sins of certain malice are more grave than sins of weakness for three reasons. First, they are present in the principle which determines moral responsibility, the will. Second, because in sins of passion, the will is only born to the sin while the passion endures. In sins of malice, “the will is inclined to the act of sin from an enduring habit, which does not pass away but persists as a kind of form now become immanent and connatural.” This means that the person finds repentance more difficult. He likes to sin. Third, in sins of weakness, the person intends something good but cannot persist in this because of passion. In sins of malice, the will is ordered to an evil end and “has a fixed intention of sinning.”

In sins of malice, there is no mitigation. The person who commits a sin of weakness or ignorance easily repents from it. In the case of ignorance, when he can know, he is sorry because the evil itself is not firmly fixed in his character. In the case of weakness, when the passion dies as it must, the person can more soberly consider the situation and also easily repents. But in the case of malice, the person not only does evil but loves it and so he finds repentance much more difficult. “Therefore he who sins from malice sins most gravely and dangerously and cannot easily be induced to refrain from sin as can one who sins from weakness in whom at least a good intention remains.” This is the reason the confessor must have a clear
and flawless knowledge of the moral law, but at the same time treat the penitent with great mercy because men rarely have such an inner drive to evil that they sin from certain malice.

EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN: GOD, MATERIAL THINGS, THE DEVIL

There are three external forces which can influence willing: God, material things and the devil. These three things in turn operate in three ways to influence willing: “the object, appealing to man’s will through his external senses, the one who presents the object, and the one who persuades us of the objects goodness (and that could be the devil or some other man).”

Exterior things can move the will to desire but not in a deterministic fashion. Man is only determined to desire the ultimate good. Neither the devil nor another man can force man to sin. They can persuade and suggest, but the will always remains free. “The bad angels [lead] to man’s harm either so far as concerns the affect of sin, namely inasmuch as man from the things he apprehends is incited to pride or to some other sin, or to impede the understanding of the truth itself according as man from certain things apprehended by the mind is led into a doubt which he knows not how to solve and thus is drawn into error.” In the same way, other men may lead by persuasion and suggestion, though the demons can influence the thought patterns of men directly through the imagination as they can move the body and so those chemical reactions which affect man’s sense perceptions, “the
demon fills as it were with befogging mists all the paths of understanding though which the mind’s ray customarily diffuses the light of reason.”

The only sufficient and direct cause for the action of sin is the will itself which though it may be influenced by other people, and sense desires and by the devil always remains free to not be moved. “So, though God is the ultimate cause of all our inward movements, that a man’s will makes a bad decision comes directly from the will itself, and indirectly from the devil through persuasion and presentation of desirable objects.”

ORIGINAL SIN

Sin is customarily distinguished between Original Sin and Actual sin which regards the cause of sin. Then actual sin is further distinguished regarding punishment into mortal and venial sin.

Original sin and actual sin differ because one is a defect of nature and not an action. The other is an action. Though the Original Sin is caused by an individual action of disobedience on the part of Adam and Eve, the nature of this sin is not a deed. Adam and Eve enjoyed a relationship of contemplative union with God characterized by grace and special gifts in the intellect, will, passions and body. They were “naked and not ashamed.” (Gen. 2:25) For them, the body was a means by which they gave themselves as gifts to one another, a gift which was ratified in the sexual act. Since there was no sin, they had no fear that they would be dominated by the other or the gift of self taken from them so that they would be
merely objects of pleasure for the other. This condition was one which they could pass on to their descendants. It was a state of being. This condition endured as long as they both demonstrated their loving obedience through respect for God’s law. At the suggestion of the tempter, they questioned the gift of God and so showed little love. They lost grace, the source of this condition.

As a result, a new state entered the human race characterized by the loss of grace. That new state has two characteristics. “What defines inherited (original) sin is the loss of the original subjection of will to God, and every other disorder of the powers of man’s soul is, so to speak, matter that is now formed by that loss.” So the formal cause of original sin is the loss of grace and the state of original justice. The powers of the soul are the subject affected by this loss: ignorance in the intellect, malice in the will, concupiscence in the passions and suffering and death in the body.

So, Original Sin relates to moral theology in the sense that man’s weakness in knowing truth, willing good and spontaneity has its origin here. Man now enters the world with this weakness and though his powers remain in their natural orientation which means man is not totally depraved, they need healing in order to be able to act again in integrity and certainly to desire heaven.

The whole human race is in Adam ‘as one body of one man.’ By this ‘unity of the human race’ all men are implicated in Adam’s sin, as all are implicated in Christ’s justice. ... It [Original Sin] is a sin which will be transmitted by propagation to all mankind, that is, by the transmission of a human nature deprived of original holiness and justice. And that is why original sin is called ‘sin’ only in an analogical
sense; it is a sin ‘contracted’ and not ‘committed’ – a state and not an act. (CCC, 404)

ACTUAL SIN: MORTAL AND VENIAL

Actual sin on the other hand is an act.

Actual sin is found first found in a principle, namely the will, which is the first subject of sin … and is transmitted from it to the other powers of the soul, and even to the members of the body, according as they are moved by the will. xlvi

This has traditionally been divided into mortal and venial sin or sin by which charity and grace are killed because the matter is so central to the journey of the human soul towards heaven, and sin in which grace and charity can still exist.

There has been some debate since Vatican II as to whether the Church still teaches the division of mortal and venial sin. John Paul II clarified the fact that it does.

Here we have the core of the church's traditional teaching, which was reiterated frequently and vigorously during the recent synod. The synod in fact not only reaffirmed the teaching of the Council of Trent concerning the existence and nature of mortal and venial sins, but it also recalled that mortal sin is sin whose object is grave matter and which is also committed with full knowledge and deliberate consent. It must be added--as was likewise done at the synod--that some sins are intrinsically grave and mortal by reason of their matter. That is, there exist acts which, per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason
of their object. These acts, if carried out with sufficient awareness and freedom, are always gravely sinful.\textsuperscript{xlvii}

The first point to make about this division is that mortal sin is sin in the strict sense of the word. By it, the soul loses the ability to arrive at heaven because it is an action which is incompatible with the existence of grace in the soul. The requirements for a mortal sin affect all three powers of the soul which divide sins of weakness, ignorance and malice. It must be grave matter so it must objectively be about some serious human good which is not peripheral but central to man arriving at heaven. The will must freely embrace it and so the intellect must move the will without mitigation. The passions must also not be so involved that they compromise the freedom of the will and so deliberate consent is necessary. “For a sin to be mortal, three conditions must together be met: ‘Mortal sin is sin whose object is grave matter and which is also committed with full knowledge and deliberate consent’.” (\textit{CCC}, 1857 quoting John Paul II, \textit{Reconciliatio et Paenitentia}, 17, 12)

There have been many misunderstandings since Vatican II on the necessity of the confession of mortal sins or whether there can be mortal sins. The Catechism uses these terms\textsuperscript{xlviii} and since the Church still recognizes the distinction between mortal and venial sins, confession is still necessary for all remembered mortal sins, species and number. “The first conviction is that for a Christian the sacrament of penance is the primary way of obtaining forgiveness and the remission of serious sin committed after baptism.”\textsuperscript{xlix} This is because since mortal sin entails an action
which precludes the presence of grace, there is no power in the soul to return to grace. Our Lord established the sacrament of Penance in order to return man to grace after baptism in light of mortal sin. The reason all sins must be confessed species and number is because the mercy of Christ must be applied to each action which has precluded the presence of grace.

In addition, the sacrament of Penance is spiritual medicine from the spiritual doctor who is Christ. In order for the medicine to be applied properly to the individual, the nature of the disease must be identified. If one went to a human physician and refused to express the nature, occurrence and place of the disease, a human physician could not prescribe medicine. In human healing, the physician cannot know the disease without the expression of the patient. God, of course, knows this. The requirement that the penitent accuse himself by expressing his spiritual failings is for the penitent’s sake so he can acknowledge where he needs healing. The penitential rite or an act of contrition cannot in themselves heal such a breach of inner life.

Venial sin is not a sin in the strict sense of the word. A person may commit a venial sin and still preserve his inner relationship with God. Venial sin does not involve a disorder regarding the end but only a disorder regarding the means to the end. It can be healed by human actions. Venial sin is not against the law, since the one who commits a venial sin neither acts against or according to the law. He rather acts beside the law by not observing the measure of truth which the law intends. Venial sin is disorder of soul which does not cause a turning away from
God either because the action is not grave or the intention is not present. “Venial sin is not turned toward a transitory good as to an end; and therefore it is not turned toward a transitory good as to a terminus other than God to such an extent that on that account it is necessarily turned away from God.”

Since venial sin does not involve a rupture with the ultimate end, no number of venial sins can cause such a rupture. Venial sin does not involve a stain in the soul. A direct intervention in the soul through the sacrament of Penance is not needed. This does not mean that one should not be concerned about venial sins or not confess them. This would be to reduce morals again to playing it safe within the extreme demands of the law in relation to freedom. The more man’s inner freedom is compromised by willing and performing actions which cannot lead to heaven, even if they are not against it, the more lukewarm the individual is about desiring heaven. This is the reason both concern and frequent confession of venial sins is recommended but not required by the Church. “Without being strictly necessary, confession of everyday faults (venial sins) is nevertheless strongly recommended by the Church. Indeed the regular confession of our venial sins helps us form our conscience, fight against evil tendencies, let ourselves be healed by Christ and progress in the life of the Spirit. By receiving more frequently through this sacrament the gift of the Father's mercy, we are spurred to be merciful as he is merciful.” (CCC, 1457)
Peter Lombard or Petrus Lombardus: (c. 1100 — July 20, 1160 in Paris) was a scholastic theologian and bishop and author of *Four Books of Sentences*, which became the standard textbook of theology, for which he is also known as Magister Sententiarum.


“Quod quidem fit per habitum; qui cum sit per modum cuiusdam naturae, operationem sibi propriae naturae reddat, et per consequens delectabilem. Nam convenientia est delectationis causa; unde philosophus, in II Ethic., ponit signum habitus, delectationem in operem existentem.” Thomas Aquinas, *De Virtutibus in Communi* (Henceforth: DVC), translated by Ralphy McInerny, (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2009) 1, 1, ad corp.

“Qua quidem scientia existente, in particulari actu contingit iudicium rationis intercipi, ut non recte diuudicet; et propter hoc dicitur parum valere ad virtutem, quia ea existente contingit hominem contra virtutem peccare. Sed ad prudentiam pertinet recte iudicare de singulis agibilibus, prout sint nunc agenda: quod quidem iudicium corruptionem per quodlibet peccatum. Et ideo prudentia manente, homo non peccat; unde ipsa non parum sed multum confert ad virtutem; immo ipsam virtutem causat, ut dictum est.” Aquinas, *DVC*, 1, 6, ad 1.

“Unde voluntas non indiget aliquo habitu virtutis inclinante ipsam ad bonum quod est sibi proportionatum, quia in hoc ex ipsa ratione potentiae tendit; sed ad bonum quod transcendent proportionem potentiae, indiget habitu virtutis. [...] Sic ergo duae virtutes sunt in voluntate sicut in subiecto; scilicet caritas et iustitia.” Aquinas, *DVC*, 1, 5, ad corp.


1 Cor. 13:1-4 quoted in *CCC* 1826.

*CCC*, 1827.


Pinkaers, *Sources*, 466.

Ibid.


Secundum hoc igitur tria inveniuntur opponi virtuti. Quorum unum est peccatum, quod opponitur sibi ex parte eius ad quod virtus ordinatur, nam peccatum proprie nominat actum inordinatum, sicut actus virtutis est actus ordinatus et debitus.” Aquinas, ST, I-II, 71, ad corp.


“Et ideo peccata specie distinguuntur ex parte actuum voluntariorum, magis quam ex parte inordinationis in peccato existentis. Actus autem voluntarii distinguuntur specie secundum obiecta, ut in superioribus ostensum est. Unde sequitur quod peccata proprie distinguantur specie secundum obiecta.” Aquinas, ST, I-II, 72, ad corp.


Terruwe and Baars, Psychic, 26.

Terruwe and Baars, Psychic, note 26, 32.

CCC, 1859.

CCC, 1860.

“Ratio ligatur ex hoc quod intentio animae applicatur vehementer ad actum appetitus sensitivi; unde avertitur a considerando in particulari id quod habitualiter in universali cognoscit.” Aquinas, De Malo, 3, 10, ad corp.

Applicare autem intentionem ad aliquid vel non applicare, in potestate voluntatis existit. Unde in potestate voluntatis est quod ligamen rationis excludat. Actus ergo commissus, qui ex tali ligamine procedit est voluntarius, unde non excusatur a culpa etiam mortali. Sed si ligatio rationis per passionem in tantum procederet, quod non esset in potestate voluntatis huiusmodi ligamen removere, puta si per aliquam animae passionem aliquis in insaniam verteretur, quidquid committeret, non imputaretur ei ad culpam, sicut nec aliis insano. Nisi forte quantum ad principium talis passionis quod fuit voluntarium.” Aquinas, Ibid.

“Et ideo quanto motus voluntatis fuerit fortior ad peccandum, tanto peccatum est maurus; sed quanto passio fuerit fortior impellens ad peccandum, tanto fit minus.” Aquinas, DM, 3, 11, ad 3.

CCC, 1859. The changes in the verbs are the author’s.

Ilid. The changes in the verbs are the author’s.

“Si ergo contingat quod aliquis in tantum velit aliqua delectatione frui, puta adulterio vel quocumque huiusmodi appetibili, ut non refugiat incurrere deformitatem peccati, quam percipit esse coniunctam ei quod vult […] unde adulter et delectationem vult quidem principaliter, et secundario vult deformitatem,” Aquinas, DM, 3, 12, ad corp.

“Sed in eo qui peccat ex malitia, voluntas inclinatur in actum peccati manente habitu, qui non transit, sed perseverat, ut forma quaedam iam immanens et connaturalis facta.” Aquinas, DM, 3, 13, ad corp.

“habet enim firmatum propositum ad peccandum.” Ibid.

“Sic ergo gravissime et periculose peccat qui peccat ex malitia, et non potest de facili revocari, sicut revocatur ille qui peccat ex infirmitate, in quo ad minus manet bonum propositum.” Ibid.

“Uno modo, ipsum obiectum propositum, sicut dicimus quod cibus excitat desiderium hominis ad comedendum. Alio modo, ille qui proponit vel offert huiusmodi obiectum. Tertio modo, ille qui persuadet obiectum propositum habere rationem boni, quia et hic aliquam propositum proprium obiectum voluntati, quod est rationis bonum verum vel appetens.” Aquinas, ST, I-II, 80, ad corp.

“Daemon quibusdam nebulis implet omnes meatus intelligentiae, per quos pandere lumen rationis radius mentis solet.” Ibid.

“Caelum est universale principium omnis interius naturae, sed quod determinetur ad alium consilium voluntas humana, hoc directe quidem est ex voluntate humana; et a Diabolo per modum persuasivit, vel appetibilium proponit.” Aquinas, ST, I-II, 80, ad corp.

“Sic ergo privatio originalis iustitiae, per quam voluntas subdebatur Deo, est formale in peccato originali, omnis autem alia inordinatio virium animae se habet in peccato originali sicut quidam materiale.” Aquinas, ST, I-II, 82, 3, ad corp.

“Manifestum est autem quod peccatum actuale primo inventur in aliquo principio, scilicet in voluntate, quae primo est susceptiva peccati, ut supra dictum est, et ab ea derivatur in alias potestias animae, et etiam in membra corporis, secundum quod moventur a voluntate.” Aquinas, DM, 4, 6, ad corp.
Veniale autem non convertitur ad bonum commutabile ut ad finem; et ideo non convertitur ad ipsum ut ad alium terminum a Deo, ut propter hoc sit necessarium a Deo averti.” Aquinas, DM. 7, 1, ad 3.